日本OR学会 《ゲーム理論と市場設計》 研究部会

Game Theory and Market Design
スポンサーサイト

一定期間更新がないため広告を表示しています

| - | | - | - |
ゲーム理論と市場設計 研究会予定
研究会予定【2010年度】

※ 各研究会の案内にリンクしています.
end04月17日  講師:H. Salonen氏(Univ. of Turku)

end06月25日  講師:渡辺隆裕氏(首都大学東京)

end07月16日  講師:岡本吉央氏(東京工業大学)

end07月26日  講師:国本隆氏(ブラウン大学)

end10月15日  講師:坂井豊貴氏(横浜国立大学)

end11月19日  講師:Arkadii Slinko氏(Univ. of Auckland)

soon12月17日  講師:松林伸生氏(慶応大学)

クリップ01月28日  講師:穂刈享氏(慶応大学)


ひらめき(未定)の場合,講師のご都合により開催日程が変更になることもあります.
ひらめき終了分には打消し線を引いてあります.

next日程の調整にご活用ください.
| ゲーム理論と市場設計 | 18:07 | - | - |
ゲーム理論と市場設計 第16回研究会
日 時: 12月17日(金) 17:00〜18:30

場 所: 東京工業大学大岡山キャンパス西9号館6階607号室

テーマ: 「Strategic Multi-store Opening under Financial Constraint (joint work with Tetsuya Iida)」

講 師:  松林伸生氏(慶応義塾大学理工学部管理工学科)

概 要:This paper analyzes strategic store openings in a situation in which firms can open multiple stores depending on the financial constraints of the firm. Specifically, given any upper limit of the number of store openings that two potentially symmetric firms can open, they sequentially determine the number of store openings, including their locations, to maximize their profits. As a result of our analysis in a microeconomic framework, we show that the equilibrium strategy can be wholly classified into only two following opposite strategies according to the level of their financial constraints involved. When firms can afford to invest significant amounts of money in the market, the leader chooses "segmentation strategy," in which a part of the market can be monopolized by opening a chain of multiple stores and deterring the follower’s entry. In contrast, when the leader has a severe financial constraint so that it can only monopolize less than half of the market, the leader chooses "minimum differentiation strategy," where firms open each of their stores at exactly the same point as the rival's. Under this strategy, the leader necessarily captures just half of the market. Furthermore, we show that regardless of potential symmetry between firms, both first and second mover advantages in terms of profit can occur in the equilibrium.
| ゲーム理論と市場設計 | 18:06 | - | - |
ゲーム理論と市場設計 第15回研究会
日 時: 11月19日(金) 17:00〜18:30

場 所: 東京工業大学大岡山キャンパス西9号館6階607号室

テーマ: 「Simple Games Beyond Weighted Majority Games」

講 師:  Arkadii Slinko氏(Department of Mathematics, University of Auckland)

概 要:We give necessary and sufficient conditions for a simple game to have rough weights. We define two functions f(n) and g(n) that measure the deviation of a simple game from a weighted majority game and roughly weighted majority game, respectively. We formulate known results in terms of lower and upper bounds for these functions and improve those bounds. In particular, we improve the lower bound previously achieved on Gabelman games. The new bound is linear in n while the old one was the square root of n. We also investigate rough weightedness of simple games with a small number of players. We also suggest three possible ways to classify simple games beyond the classes of weighted and roughly weighted games. To this end we introduce three hierarchies of games and prove some relations between their classes. We prove that our hierarchies are true (i.e., infinite) hierarchies. In particular, they are strict in the sense that more of the key ``resource'' (which may, for example, be the size or structure of the ``tie-breaking'' region where the weights of the different coalitions are considered so close that we are allowed to specify either winningness or nonwinningness of the coalition), yields the flexibility to capture strictly more games.
| ゲーム理論と市場設計 | 18:12 | - | - |
ゲーム理論と市場設計 第14回研究会
日 時: 10月15日(金) 17:00〜18:30

場 所: 東京工業大学大岡山キャンパス西9号館6階607号室

テーマ: 「Impartial Welfare Orderings in Infinite Time Horizon」

講 師:  坂井豊貴氏(横浜国立大学経済学部)

概 要:Impartial treatment of all generations is a fundamental ethical principle in intertemporal welfare evaluation, espoused by both egalitarianism and utilitarianism. We show that any welfare ordering that fully respects this principle, as well as other standard axioms, is simply represented by a two-dimensional function that only depends on the limit inferior and the limit superior of an infinite utility stream. Among the class of such orderings, the limit inferior appears as an egalitarian criterion, while the sum of the limit inferior and the limit superior appears as a utilitarian criterion. Leximin orderings whose first priority is in the limit inferior and the second is in the limit superior are also characterized.
| ゲーム理論と市場設計 | 11:41 | - | - |
ゲーム理論と市場設計 第13回研究会
日 時: 7月26日(月) 17:00〜18:30

場 所: 東京工業大学大岡山キャンパス西9号館6階607号室

テーマ: 「Robust Virtual Implementation with Almost Complete Information」

講 師:  国本隆氏(McGill University)

概 要:Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2010) show that, in quasilinear environments with incomplete information where interim preferences of types are diverse, any incentive compatible social choice function is robustly virtually implementable in iteratively undominated strategies. This paper offers two main results: First, I unify implementation results by adjusting its general analysis to complete information and show that when there are at least three agents, any social choice function is robustly virtually implementable. Indeed, this is a result of Abreu and Matsushima (1992) that only applies to "non-generic" environments, i.e., complete information. Therefore, I also show that permissive virtual implementation results are unchanged even under "almost" complete information.
| ゲーム理論と市場設計 | 22:44 | - | - |
1/11 >>Copyright © paperboy&co. All Rights Reserved.